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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

As to whether or not transfers of property were made “in contemplation
of death” is a question that arises in a large number of cases involving the
payment of estate taxes. In a recent court decision the judge observed:
“ Contemplation of death is not the general knowledge of all men that
they must die but it must be a present apprehension from some existing
bodily or mental condition or impending peril, creating a reasonable fear
that death is near at hand, and ... so arising it must be the direct and
animating cause and the only cause, of the transfer.” (U. S. district
court, western district of Pennsylvania, Rea, Executrix v. Heiner, Collector.)

The case in which the court so interpreted the phrase “in contemplation of
death” involved a large amount of taxes paid as well and was quite interesting
from other points of view. Reading lengthy decisions upon involved tax ques
tions does not ordinarily appeal to one as offering anything but close concen
tration and painful thinking. However, to those who endeavor to keep posted
upon the subject of taxation it is apparent there is much of human interest
in the cases that pass in review before them.
The case just cited is a fair example of this fact, as shown by a digest of the
ruling, which is now quoted:
“Transfers of a material part of an estate about six months prior to her
death by a woman seventy-six years of age, active, mentally alert, with
no serious illness during her lifetime and anticipating a substantially
longer life, one effect of which transfers was to bring a daughter back to
the home city of the transferor, were not transfers in contemplation of
death.”

In the few words in which the decision is compressed is found quite a compre
hensive picture of a given situation, not unpleasing to contemplate.
The United States district court, district of Virginia, in a decision rendered
late in June (Parrott v. Noel) overruled decision No. 1, docket No. 1 of the
United States board of tax appeals. The case involved the interpretation as
to whether “a gratuitous appropriation” by the board of directors of a cor
poration, of certain of the profits to be set aside for certain of its officers and
employees, was additional compensation or a gift to them. The board held
that it was not extra compensation. The court held that it was a gift.
Another decision by the board of tax appeals of interest to accountants who
try cases before it is that in which the board held that the minute record of
a corporation was not sufficiently established to be such authentic record
because no witness was present at the hearing who could definitely identify the
book as being that which it was represented to be. This is important because
it shows the care one must take in identifying written documents if they are
to be acceptable as evidence.
As a study in consistency we recommend the reading of decision No. 587,
docket 3064, wherein commission earned in one year but not determined until
the following year was taxable income in the year in which the commission was
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determined. Then read decision 563, docket 1726, wherein the board ruled
that a loss sustained in 1920 on sale of stock, the amount of which loss could
not be determined until 1921, was a deductible loss in 1920.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
An expressed intention in a resolution that a gratuitous appropriation should
be made for certain payments to officers of a corporation, when there had been
no binding agreement for such payments, evidences a gift, and the payments
do not constitute taxable income under the act of 1918. (U. S. district court,
D. Virginia, Parrott v. Noel, Collector.)
The commissioner was ordered to obey board of tax appeals subpoena calling
for detailed data of representative corporations to provide a comparative basis
of computation of excess-profits taxes of an appellant before the board. (Su
preme court of D. C., Oesterlein Machine Company v. Commissioner.)
A suit to restrain the collection of a tax may not be enjoined though the tax
be subject of a jeopardy assessment and the taxpayer has appealed to the
U. S. board of tax appeals. (U. S. district court, E. D. Pennsylvania, Emans
Silk Co. v. McCaughn.)
Where a transfer in trust was made by one whose expectancy of life was
about sixteen years, the beneficiaries being contingent and to come into posses
sion after thirty years, it was held the equitable estate remained in suspension
and the trust fund was intended to take effect in possession after the death of
the grantor and was therefore part of the gross estate subject to the estate tax.
(U. S. circuit court of appeals, 8th circuit, Shukert et al., Executors v. Allen,
Collector.)
Transfers of a material part of an estate about six months prior to her death
by a woman seventy-six years old, who at time of transfer was active, mentally
alert, with no serious illness during her lifetime and anticipating a substantially
longer life, one effect of which transfers was to bring a daughter back to the
home city of the transferor, were not transfers in contemplation of death.
(U. S. district court, W. D. Pennsylvania, Rea, Executrix v. Heiner, Collector.)
Where property is sold and the vendor receives as part payment of the pur
chase price a second mortgage payable in installments over a period of twelve
years, the amount of taxable gain derived from the sale shall be computed by
considering the second mortgage at its fair market value, if any, at the time
when the transaction was closed. (B. T. A. decision 548, docket 2401.)
Where closing inventories were made without actual knowledge of market
conditions and prices, the values may be revised by bona-fide market prices as
certained within a reasonable time thereafter. (B. T. A. decision 549, docket
2228.)
On the evidence, taxpayer’s restoration to invested capital of amounts that
previously had been consistently written off as depreciation of patterns and
drawings, is disallowed. (B. T. A. decision 552, docket 776.)
The cost of devising and installing a cost system is a business expense and is
not includible in invested capital for tax purposes. (B. T. A. decision 558,
docket 881.)
The minutes of a corporation are not sufficiently established by showing that
they are contained in a book believed by the witnesses to be the minute book,
where the witnesses were not present at the alleged meetings, did not prepare
or sign the alleged minutes, and no officer or other person present at the alleged
meetings testified. (B. T. A. decision 569, docket 2688.)
Commissions earned during a year but not determined until the following
year, are income in the latter year where taxpayer is upon a cash basis. (B. T.
A. decision 587, docket 3064.)
A loss sustained on certain stocks sold in 1920, the amount of which loss was
unknown to the taxpayer until 1921, was held to be deductible in 1920, (B. T.
A. decision 563, docket 1726.)
Amounts expended to restore soil fertility preparatory to the production of
crops in future years are capital expenditures. (B. T. A. decision 589, docket
460.)
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Taxes may not be accrued until they become due and payable, and invested
capital may not be reduced by the amount of such taxes until they are due.
(B. T. A. decision 592, docket 324.)
A corporation engaged only in selling the expert services of its stockholders
was held to be a personal-service corporation. (B. T. A. decision 593, docket
894.)
Where a seat on the New York stock exchange, which was received by a
partnership at an agreed valuation as a partner’s capital contribution, is sold
at a loss, such loss is deductible for tax purposes. (B. T. A. decision 594,
docket 2567.)
Where lessee in 1919 pays the 1918 income taxes of the lessor as required by
the lease, the amount paid is not income to the lessor. (B. T. A. decision 599,
docket 2020.)
A transfer by a husband to his wife of stock at a market price but less than
cost for her note payable in five years, the stock being immediately endorsed
in blank and returned to him and her note being subsequently destroyed by the
husband, was held not to constitute a valid sale entitling him to deduct the
loss on the transaction. (B. T. A. decision 600, docket 1910.)
TREASURY RULINGS

(T. A. 3702—May 13, 1925)
Bankruptcy—Decision of Court
Bankruptcy—Decisions of Supreme Court
1. Bankruptcy—Federal Tax—Priority—Labor Claims.
Under the provisions of sections 64 (a) and 64 (b) of the bankruptcy act a
claim for federal taxes takes priority in payment over labor wage claims
where the assets of the estate are insufficient to pay all claims in full.
2. Cases Distinguished and Followed.
Richmond v. Bird (249 U. S., 174) distinguished; Guarantee Co. v. Title
Guaranty Co. (224 U. S., 152) followed; judgment of the United States circuit
court of appeals for the ninth circuit (174 Fed., 385; T. D. 3501 [C. B. II-2,
341]) affirmed.
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the case of
A. J. Oliver, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the West Coast Rubber Corporation et al. v.
United States is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and
others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States
A. J. Oliver, as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of West Coast Rubber Corpora
tion; Oscar Courtin, Dorothy E. Knight, et al., petitioners, v. The United
States of America and City and County of San Francisco
On writ of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the
ninth circuit
[April 15, 1925]
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.
The bankrupt’s estate consisted of personal property only, and there is no
suggestion of a lien thereon to secure any of the claims now under consideration.
The fund derived from conversion of all the property is insufficient fully to
satisfy taxes due the United States and the city and county of San Francisco and
the allowed claims for preferred wages. Which of these must be paid first is the
question for decision. The referee ruled in favor of the wages, and the district
court approved; but the circuit court of appeals held to the contrary and di
rected that priority should be given the taxes.
The bankruptcy act of 1898 (ch. 541, 30 Stat., 544, 565) provides—
"Sec. 64. Debts which have priority.—a. The court shall order the trustee
to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States,
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state, county, district, or municipality in advance of the payment of dividends
to creditors, and upon filing the receipts of the proper public officers for such
payment he shall be credited with the amount thereof, and in case any question
arises as to the amount or legality of any such tax the same shall be heard and
determined by the court.
“b. The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid in
full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall be (1) the actual
and necessary cost of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition;
(2) the filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases; (3) the cost of adminis
tration, including the fees and mileage payable to witnesses as now or hereafter
provided by the laws of the United States, and one reasonable attorney’s fee,
for the professional services actually rendered, irrespective of the number of
attorneys employed, to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases, to the
bankrupt in involuntary cases while performing the duties herein prescribed,
and to the bankrupt in voluntary cases, as the court may allow; (4) wages due
to workmen, clerks, or servants which have been earned within three months
before the date of the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed $300 to each
claimant; and (5) debts owing to any person who by the laws of the states or the
United States is entitled to priority.”
Guarantee Co. v. Title Guaranty Co. (224 U. S., 125, 159, 160) held that under
section 64 wages were entitled to priority over the claim of the United States
for damages occasioned by the bankrupt’s failure to comply with a construction
contract. It was there said—
“ By the statute of 1797 (now sec. 3466) and section 5101 of the Revised Stat
utes all debts due to the United States were expressly given priority to the
wages due any operative, clerk, or house servant. A different order is pre
scribed by the act of 1898, and something more. Labor claims are given prior
ity, and it is provided that debts having priority shall be paid in full. The only
exception is ‘taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States,
state, county, district or municipality.' These were civil obligations, not per
sonal conventions, and preference was given to them, but as to debts we must
assume a change of purpose in the change of order. And we can not say that it
was inadvertent. The act takes into consideration, we think, the whole range of
indebtedness of the bankrupt—national, state, and individual—and assigns the
order of payment. The policy which it dictated was beneficent and well might
induce a postponement of the claims, even of the sovereign, in favor of those
who necessarily depended upon their daily labor. And to give such claims
priority could in no case seriously affect the sovereign. To deny them priority
would in all cases seriously affect the claimants.”
In City of Richmond v. Bird (249 U. S., 174, 177), past due taxes were denied
priority of payment over a debt secured by a lien which the state law recognized
as superior to the city’s claim for such taxes. We said—
“Respondents therefore must prevail unless priority over their lien is given
by section 64a to claim for taxes which, under state law, occupied no better
position than one held by a general creditor. Section 67d, bankruptcy act,
quoted supra, declares that liens given or accepted in good faith and not in
contemplation of or in fraud upon this act, shall not be affected by it. Other
provisions must, of course, be construed in view of this positive one. Section
64a directs that taxes be paid in advance of dividends to creditors; and ‘divi
dend, ’ as commonly used throughout the act, means partial payment to general
creditors. In section 65b, for example, the word occurs in contrast to payment
of debts which have priority. And as the local laws gave no superior right to
the city’s unsecured claim for taxes we are unable to conclude that congress
tended by section 64a to place it ahead of valid lien holders.”
Of course, this opinion must be read in the light of the question under con
sideration—does section 64 require that taxes shall be paid in advance of debts
secured by liens which under the local law are superior to claims for such taxes?
We pointed out that section 67d preserves valid liens and is not qualified by the
direction of section 64a to discharge taxes “in advance of the payment of
dividends to creditors,” since “‘dividend,’ as commonly used throughout the
act, means partial payment to general creditors.” We did not undertake to
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decide in what order, as among themselves, taxes and the debts specified by
section 64 should be satisfied; that point was not presented.
The language of section 64 has caused much uncertainty, and widely dif
ferent views of its true meaning may be found in the opinions of district courts
and circuit courts of appeals.
Paragraph “a” directs that “the court shall order the trustee to pay all
taxes legally due and owing ... in advance of (not next preceding) the pay
ment of dividends to creditors”—that is, partial payments to general creditors.
(City of Richmond v. Bird, supra.) It does not undertake otherwise to fix the
precise position which shall be accorded to them. This, we think, must be
determined upon consideration of the circumstances of each case and the
provisions of relevant federal and local laws—e. g., those which prescribe liens
to secure or special priority for tax claims. It also appears, plainly enough,
that all debts mentioned in paragraph “b” must be satisfied before any
payment to general creditors.
Guarantee Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., supra, declares that the taxes of para
graph “a” are “civil obligations, not personal conventions, and preference
was given to them” over the wages specified by clause (4), paragraph “b.”
We adhere to this as a correct statement of the general rule to be followed
whenever it does not clearly appear that the particular tax has been subordi
nated to claims for wages by some relevant law.
We find no error in the action of the court below. The cause will be re
manded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Affirmed.
(T. D. 3709—May 22, 1925)
Coöperative associations.—Article 522 of regulations 65 amended
The last two sentences of subdivision (a) of article 522, regulations 65, are
hereby amended to read as follows:
“The restriction placed on the ownership of the capital stock of an exempt
coöperative association shall not apply to preferred stock sold or issued solely
for the purpose of providing necessary working capital or acquiring property
which is required for the conduct of the association’s business, provided such
stock is not entitled or permitted to participate directly or indirectly in the
profits of the association, upon dissolution or otherwise, beyond the regular
fixed dividends, and is issued with an express provision for its early redemp
tion or retirement or for its redemption or retirement at the election of the
association, with funds to be obtained, for example, by the subsequent sale of
stock to actual producers, to the end that the producers may become the sole
owners of the capital stock. The issuance of such preferred stock to non
producers will not be grounds for denying exemption so long as the voting
control in the association is retained by shareholders who are actual producers.”
(T. D. 3708—May 22, 1925)
Tax Returns and Determination of Tax by
the Commissioner
In view of the fact that the procedure inaugurated some months ago under
which taxpayers are afforded an opportunity to be heard in the offices of the
supervising internal revenue agents and internal revenue agents in charge in
respect to reports of revenue agents upon the field examination of income-tax
returns is now upon a satisfactory basis, it appears advisable in the interests
of simplification and efficiency to eliminate one of the three hearings which
have been afforded to taxpayers prior to the final determination by the com
missioner, from which an appeal lies to the board of tax appeals. The pre
liminary hearing in cases where a field investigation is made is held in the office
of the supervising internal revenue agent or the internal revenue agent in charge.
The findings and recommendations of these agents are subject to review in the
income-tax unit, where opportunity for a hearing is again afforded the tax
payer. It has, therefore, been decided to eliminate the hearing in the solicitor’s
office, which has been accorded in all protests against deficiencies where a
taxpayer and the income-tax unit were unable to agree. This should not be
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construed as prohibiting the income-tax unit from obtaining the opinion of the
solicitor upon questions of law arising in any case which are not clearly covered
by existing regulations or published rulings of the department or the published
opinions of the solicitor. The following procedure for the examination of
income-tax returns and the determination of tax by the commissioner is,
accordingly, prescribed:
1. Effective June 1, 1925, treasury decision 3616 [C. B. Ill—2, 275] is hereby
rescinded.
2. Effective June 1, 1925, article 1211 of regulations 65 is hereby amended
to read as follows:
“All returns, except returns made on form 1040-A and such other returns as
the collector may be authorized by the commissioner to audit, will be for
warded to the commissioner. As soon as practicable thereafter they will be
given a preliminary examination in the income-tax unit. Copies of all returns
will be referred to the field for investigation except those which, from the pre
liminary examination made in the income-tax unit, apparently can be closed on
the basis of the information at hand without correspondence with the taxpayer.
“ Upon the completion of a field investigation made under the supervision of a
supervising internal-revenue agent or internal revenue agent in charge, the
taxpayer will be notified of the result of the investigation and furnished with
a copy of the examining officer’s report. Within 30 days from the date of the
letter of notification the taxpayer may file with the supervising internalrevenue agent or internal-revenue agent in charge a protest against the deter
mination of any additional taxes which the investigating agent finds to be
due. If a protest is filed, the supervising internal-revenue agent or internalrevenue agent in charge will cause the protest of the taxpayer to be carefully
considered in his office and will afford the taxpayer an opportunity to be
heard, provided that request for a hearing is made in the protest. The super
vising internal-revenue agent or internal-revenue agent in charge will forward
the original and one duplicate copy of all protests, briefs, or statements of
additional facts to Washington with the report of the examining agent,
together with any conference reports and the recommendation of the super
vising internal-revenue agent or internal-revenue agent in charge. If no
protest is filed by the taxpayer with the supervising internal-revenue agent or
internal-revenue agent in charge within the prescribed time, the report of the
investigating agent will be forwarded to the commissioner with the recom
mendation of the supervising internal-revenue agent or internal-revenue
agent in charge. In either event the case will then be audited in the incometax unit, and the taxpayer will be advised by letter of any deficiency of tax
which appears to exist. Within 30 days from the date of the notification
letter the taxpayer may request a hearing in the income-tax unit. If upon
further consideration it appears that a deficiency of tax exists, final determina
tion thereof will be made and the taxpayer will be notified by registered mail
in accordance with the provisions of section 274 (a) of the statute. See
article 1232.
“As to those returns which apparently can be closed upon the basis of in
formation at hand, if the preliminary audit made in the income-tax unit dis
closes that a deficiency apparently exists, the taxpayer will be notified by letter.
Within 30 days from the date of the letter of notification the taxpayer may file
in the income-tax unit a protest against the determination of the deficiency
disclosed by the audit. If no protest is received within the prescribed time, final
determination of the deficiency will be made and the taxpayer will be notified
thereof by registered mail. If a protest is filed, it will be considered in the
income-tax unit, and a hearing will be granted if requested in the protest.
Final determination of the deficiency then will be made and notification thereof
sent to the taxpayer by registered mail, unless a field investigation appears to
be necessary, in which event a copy of the return together with the protest
will be referred to the proper supervising internal-revenue agent or internal
revenue agent in charge for investigation and the taxpayer will be notified
by letter of such reference. Thereafter the case will proceed as herein pro
vided in respect to cases originally referred to the field for investigation.
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“ In special cases where by reason of the filing of a consolidated return or for
any other reason it is impracticable that the field investigation be made under
the supervision of one of the supervising internal-revenue agents or internal
revenue agents in charge, the commissioner may direct that the field investiga
tion be made by such revenue agents, special agents, or auditors as he may
specially designate. In such cases the return will be audited in the incometax unit after receipt of the report of the field investigation. The taxpayer
will be furnished with a copy of the report of the field investigation and
notified by letter of any deficiency which appears to exist. Within 30 days
from the date of the notification letter the taxpayer may file in the incometax unit a protest against the determination of the deficiency. If no protest
is filed within the prescribed time, final determination of the deficiency will
be made and the taxpayer will be notified thereof by registered mail. If a
protest is filed, it will be considered in the income-tax unit, and hearing will
be granted if requested in the protest. If it appears thereafter that deficiency
exists, final determination of the deficiency will be made and the taxpayer
will be notified thereof by registered mail.
“As to those returns which are authorized to be retained in the office of the
collector for audit, the taxpayer will be notified by letter upon the completion
of the audit of any deficiency which appears to exist. Within 30 days from
the date of the letter of notification the taxpayer may file with the collector a
protest against the determination of the deficiency. If no protest is filed
within the prescribed time final determination will be made and the taxpayer
will be notified by registered mail. If a protest is filed, it will be considered
in the collector’s office and a hearing will be granted if requested in the protest.
If the taxpayer and the collector are unable to agree respecting the amount
of the deficiency, the return and the complete file pertaining thereto will be
forwarded by the collector to the commissioner, and will be referred to the
income-tax unit for consideration, of which the taxpayer will be notified
by the collector. The taxpayer may within 30 days request a hearing in the
income-tax unit. If, after consideration by the income-tax unit, it appears
that a deficiency exists, final determination of the deficiency will be made and
the taxpayer will be notified thereof by registered mail.
“ If in the course of any field investigation it appears that a willful attempt
has been made to evade tax, the report of the investigation will be forwarded
immediately to the commissioner. No copy of the report will be furnished to
the taxpayer by the investigating agent. After completion of the audit in the
income-tax unit the taxpayer will be notified of such taxes and penalties as
appear to be due, and will be furnished with a statement showing the compu
tation of tax and penalties. Within 30 days from the date of the letter of
notification the taxpayer may file a protest, and a hearing will be granted, if
requested in the protest. In any case where it is proposed to assert the advalorem fraud penalty the hearing on the protest of the taxpayer will be under
the supervision of the solicitor of internal revenue, whose recommendation
in regard to the assertion of the ad-valorem fraud penalty will be obtained
prior to final determination of the deficiency. Thereafter final determination
of the deficiency and of the penalty, if any, will be made and the taxpayer
will be notified by registered mail.
“ If in any case the taxpayer acquiesces in the tentative or final determina
tion of the deficiency, the form of agreement consenting to assessment which
will be forwarded with the letter of notification should be executed by the tax
payer and returned in order that assessment may be made forthwith.
“A letter of protest must cover all items which the taxpayer questions and
may be accompanied by a statement of additional facts or by a brief, or both.
It must be filed in triplicate, and must contain the following information:
“(a) The name and address of the taxpayer (in the case of an individual
the residence, and in the case of a corporation the principal office or place of
business); (6) in the case of a corporation the name of the state of incor
poration; (c) the designation by date and symbol of the letter advising of
the tentative deficiency with respect to which the protest is made; (d) the
designation of the year or years involved and a statement of the amount of
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tax in dispute for each year; (e) an itemized schedule of the findings to which
the taxpayer takes exception; (f) a summary statement of the grounds upon
which the taxpayer relies in connection with each exception; and (g) in case
the taxpayer desires a hearing, statement to that effect.
"Letters of protest and accompanying statements of fact, if any, must be
executed by the taxpayer under oath."
3. AU protests filed by taxpayers under the procedure in force prior to the
effective date hereof and actually referred to the solicitor of internal revenue
will be considered by the solicitor in accordance with the procedure heretofore
in effect. All protests pending in the income-tax unit and not actually referred
to the solicitor prior to the effective date hereof will be carefully considered and
an opportunity afforded for a hearing in the income-tax unit, if a hearing has
not already been held. After consideration of the protest by the income-tax
unit, final determination will be made and the taxpayer notified thereof by
registered letter. From and after the effective date hereof protests against the
determination of deficiencies will not be referred to the solicitor except in
cases where the commissioner, or the deputy commissioner in charge of the
income-tax unit, desires the opinion of the solicitor upon a question of law,
and except in cases as herein provided where it is proposed to assert the advalorem fraud penalty.
(T. D. 3710—May 22,1925)
Income Tax—Act of October 3,1913—Decision of Supreme Court
1. Income—Trust—Life Estate—Exemptions—Gifts.
Amounts received under the terms of a will leaving the residue of an estate
in trust and providing that the income therefrom be paid to a designated
person for life, are taxable as income and are not exempt as property ac
quired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.
The following decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Irwin, Former Collector, v. E. Palmer Gavit is published for the information
of internal revenue officers and others concerned.

Supreme Court of the United States
Roscoe Irwin, Former Collector of Internal Revenue for the Fourteenth District
of New York, petitioner, v. E. Palmer Gavit
On a writ of certiorari to the United States circuit court of appeals for the second
circuit
[April 27,1925]
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit to recover taxes and penalties exacted by the collector under
the income-tax act of October 3, 1913 (ch. 16, section II, A, subdivisions 1 and
2; B, D, and E, 38 Stat., 114, 166, et seq.). The collector demurred to the com
plaint. The demurrer was overruled and judgment given for the plaintiff by
the district court (275 Fed. Rep., 643) and the circuit court of appeals (295
Fed. Rep., 84). A writ of certiorari was granted by this court (264 U. S., 579).
The question is whether the sums received by the plaintiff under the will of
Anthony N. Brady in 1913, 1914, and 1915 were income and taxed. The will,
admitted to probate August 12, 1913, left the residue of the estate in trust to
be divided into six equal parts, the income of one part to be applied so far as
deemed proper by the trustees to the education and support of the testator’s
granddaughter, Marcia Ann Gavit, the balance to be divided into two equal
parts and one of them to be paid to the testator’s son-in-law, the plaintiff, in
equal quarter-yearly payments during his life. But on the granddaughter’s
reaching the age of 21 or dying the fund went over, so that, the granddaughter
then being 6 years old, it is said, the plaintiff’s interest could not exceed 15 years.
The courts below held that the payments received were property acquired by
bequest, were not income, and were not subject to tax.
The statute in section II, A, subdivision 1, provides that there shall be
levied a tax " upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources
in the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the United States.” If
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these payments properly may be called income by the common understanding
of that word and the statute has failed to hit them it has missed so much of
the general purpose that it expresses at the start. Congress intended to use
its power to the full extent. (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S., 189, 203.) By B,
the net income is to include “gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever, including the income from but not the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent.” By D, trustees are to make
“return of the net income of the person for whom they act, subject to this
tax,” and by D, trustees and others having the control or payment of fixed or
determinable gains, etc., of another person who are required to render a return
on behalf of another are “authorized to withhold enough to pay the normal
tax.” The language quoted leaves no doubt in our minds that if a fund were
given to trustees for A for life with remainder over, the income received by
the trustees and paid over to A would be income of A under the statute. It
seems to us hardly less clear that even if there were a specific provision that
A should have no interest in the corpus, the payments would be income none
the less, within the meaning of the statute and the constitution, and by
popular speech. In the first case it is true that the bequest might be said to be
of the corpus for life, in the second it might be said to be of the income. But
we think that the provision of the act that exempts bequests assumes the gift
of a corpus and contrasts it with the income arising from it, but was not
intended to exempt income properly so-called simply because of a severance
between it and the principal fund. No such conclusion can be drawn from
Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S., 189, 206, 207). The money was income in the
hands of the trustees and we know of nothing in the law that prevented its
being paid and received as income by the donee.
The courts below went on the ground that the gift to the plaintiff was a
bequest and carried no interest in the corpus of the fund. We do not regard
those considerations as conclusive, as we have said, but if it were material a
gift of the income of a fund ordinarily is treated by equity as creating an
interest in the fund. Apart from technicalities we can perceive no distinction
relevant to the question before us between a gift of the fund for life and a
gift of the income from it. The fund is appropriated to the production of the
same result whichever form the gift takes. Neither are we troubled by the
question where to draw the line. That is the question in pretty much every
thing worth arguing in the law. (Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.,
349, 355.) Day and night, youth and age, are only types. But the distinction
between the cases put of a gift from the corpus of the estate payable in install
ments and the present seems to us not hard to draw, assuming that the gift
supposed would not be income. This is a gift from the income of a very large
fund, as income. It seems to us immaterial that the same amounts might
receive a different color from their source. We are of opinion that quarterly
payments, which it was hoped would last for 15 years, from the income of an
estate intended for the plaintiff’s child, must be regarded as income within the
meaning of the constitution and the law. It is said that the tax laws should be
construed favorably for the taxpayers. But that is not a reason for creating a
doubt or for exaggerating one when it is no greater than we can bring ourselves
to feel in this case. Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Sutherland, Dissenting
By the plain terms of the revenue act of 1913 the value of property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent is not to be included in net income. Only the
income derived from such property is subject to the tax. The question, as it
seems to me, is really a very simple one. Money, of course, is property. The
money here sought to be taxed as income was paid to respondent under the
express provisions of a will. It was a gift by will—a bequest. (United States
v. Merriam, 263 U. S., 179, 184.) It, therefore, fell within the precise letter of
the statute; and, under well-settled principles, judicial inquiry may go no fur
ther. The taxpayer is entitled to the rigor of the law. There is no latitude in
a taxing statute—you must adhere to the very words. (United States v.
Merriam, supra, 187-188.)
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The property which respondent acquired being a bequest, there is no occasion
to ask whether, before being handed over to him, it had been carved from the
original corpus of, or from subsequent additions to, the estate. The corpus
of the estate was not the legacy which respondent received, but merely the
source which gave rise to it. The money here sought to be taxed was not the
fruits of a legacy; it was the legacy itself. (Matter of Stanfield, 135 N. Y., 292,
294.)
With the utmost respect for the judgment of my brethren to the contrary,
the opinion just rendered, I think without warrant, searches the field of
argument and inference for a meaning which should be found only in the
strict letter of the statute.
Mr. Justice Butler concurs in this dissent.

(I.T. 2175)
Revenue Act of 1918
In the appeal of James P. McKenna (decision No. 127, docket No. 121, 1
B. T. A., 326), acquiesced in by the commissioner (bulletin IV-18,1), the board
of tax appeals held that the net gains of the taxpayer arising out of his illegal
business of operating a handbook constituted taxable income under the revenue
act of 1918, but that the gross income of the taxpayer derived from such book
making operations should be determined by applying against the total receipts
therefrom the sum of the amounts paid to bettors on his handbook plus amounts
returned to bettors by reason of scratches, called-off bets, and lay-off bets.
In the appeal of Mitchel M. Frey et al., executors William B. Scaife estate
(decision No. 128, docket No. 391, 1 B. T. A., 338), acquiesced in by the com
missioner (Bulletin IV-18, 1), the board of tax appeals held that losses sustained
in illegal gambling operations are not deductible under section 214 (a) of the
revenue act of 1918. The board held, however, that the taxpayer was en
titled to offset his gains from illegal transactions against his losses from such
transactions and, therefore, the amounts won by the taxpayer during the years
in question, being less than the losses sustained by him, did not constitute
taxable income.
In view of these decisions, I. T. 1983 (C. B. III—1, 124) and I .T. 2127
(bulletin IV-2, 14) are modified to conform thereto.
(T. D. 3717—June 9,1925)
Bankruptcy—Dissolved Corporation—Decision of Court
1. Corporations—Partnerships—Liability for Taxes.
Where the assets of a corporation have been transferred to a partnership
of the same name and from the partnership to a corporation of the same
name, which latter became bankrupt, the assets of the bankrupt corporation
are liable for unpaid federal taxes due from the first corporation.
2. Bankruptcy—Claims—Priority.
Where a corporation is succeeded by a partnership of the same name,
which in turn was followed by a corporation of the same name, each succeed
ing company taking over the assets of the prior organization, the United
States is entitled to priority in payment, under section 64 (a) of the bank
ruptcy act, of a claim for taxes due from the first corporation over the claims
of general creditors of the last corporation which became bankrupt.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
In the Matter of The Grand Leader, Bankrupt
[April 25, 1925]
In this tax claim the assessment made by the government is for the sum of
$1,108.62, which was made in December, 1923, for additional taxes due for the
year 1919 by a corporation of the same name as the bankrupt.
The corporation against which this assessment was made was incorporated
in the year 1917, and it was later dissolved on February 13, 1920. After this
date the same business was carried on under the same name by the stock
holders of the corporation as a partnership. However, two additional names
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were interested in the partnership, these having what is termed by the wit
nesses "a working interest.” These parties so carried on this business until
May 15, 1923, at which date a new corporation was formed under the same
name. The Grand Leader, and this corporation carried on the identical business
that has theretofore been carried on by the partnership and by the earlier
corporation.
In the bankrupt corporation the same persons owned and controlled the busi
ness, except that the two persons having a working interest in the partnership
also held shares of stock, for which they gave their promissory notes, which
were to be paid for by the earnings of the corporation.
This certificate has been before me once before. The referee, after hearing
and after giving the United States opportunity to be heard, which seemingly
was not taken advantage of promptly and fully by the government, the referee
entered an order disallowing the claim of the government for said income tax
against the bankruptcy corporation.
The United States appeared and petitioned that the certificate be returned to
the referee for the further development of the facts surrounding this tax claim
and to have it allowed against the bankruptcy corporation.
The trustee of the bankruptcy estate opposed the granting of this petition, on
the ground that the government failed to take advantage of the opportunity
already accorded it to do this, but, after considering the matter and in view of
the showing made and questions involved, the record was sent back to the
referee.
After the taking of additional testimony and hearing, the referee returned the
certificate with such additional evidence and his conclusions of fact and law
upon the record as it now stands.
The referee now finds that the government is entitled to have this tax claim
allowed as an unsecured claim against the bankrupt corporation.
The trustee of the estate and his attorneys were present and took part in
such further hearing before the referee and have been advised of his addi
tional findings as to the allowance of said tax claim of the government as an
unsecured claim.
From the findings of the referee in this matter I quote as follows:
“The testimony is rather extensive and complicated. The facts, as I see it,
should have been gotten up by an accountant from the books and submitted as
an agreed statement. It is very difficult to determine from the 21 pages of
testimony taken and submitted herewith anything pertinent to the case, except
what I have stated, which I will recapitulate as follows:
“A corporation under the name of Grand Leader, followed by a partnership
under same name, partnership followed by corporation under same name
which became bankrupt; each successive concern assumed the obligations of
its predecessor.”
I quote from the evidence, which the referee says is extensive and complicated:
“ Question. Were there any fixtures belonging to the old corporation turned
over to the partnership?
“Answer. Yes.
“Question. What was the value?
"Answer. I can not say.
“ Question. Were there any fixtures turned over from the partnership to the
new corporation?
“Answer. Yes.
“Question. Can you not give us an idea as to what the fixtures were worth?
“Answer. About $2,500.
“Question. If I get you right, about $2,500 worth of fixtures came from the
old corporation into the partnership and from the partnership into the new
corporation that is bankrupt?
“Answer. Yes, sir.
"Question (referee). Do you think they would bring that much cash if the
trustee in bankruptcy had to sell them at cash sale?
“Answer. To the best of my knowledge, that is what they would sell for
at that time.”
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Another witness, who was the main owner of this business from the first,
testified that these fixtures were at different times during the first corporation,
the partnership, and the last corporation mortgaged, but the evidence of the
witness is of a character that it leaves the court in uncertainty as to the con
dition of the fixtures of this bankrupt at the beginning of the bankruptcy pro
ceedings. However, we are not shown affirmatively that any fixtures coming
into the trustee's hands were covered by a mortgage.
On the record now before me, the United States claims that under the evi
dence taken and the finding of fact made by the referee it is entitled to pri
ority of payment of the assessed tax from the assets of the bankruptcy corpora
tion. Such priority is claimed by it under section 64 (a) of the bankruptcy act.
There is nothing before the court indicating the trusteeof the estate objects
to the referee’s findings that the government be allowed its claim for this tax
as an unsecured claim against the bankruptcy estate. This being the case, the
only question now for determination is whether the government is entitled
to the claim of priority for the amount of this assessment. Upon this ques
tion the United States has submitted a brief.
The “Grand Leader” became bankrupt while owing the tax claimed here by
the government, and under the provisions of section 64 (a) of the bankruptcy
law the government is given the right of priority for this income tax. The
claim being shown to be a tax claim, there is only the question of its being
legally due and owing by the bankrupt. This tax claim of the government,
which is admitted to be a personal liability of the bankrupt, is entitled to pri
ority of payment by virtue of section 64 (a) of the bankruptcy act.
According to my views, there is no necessity for the existence of a lien to
the government to vitalize priority here claimed. The record shows that the
different agreements by which the partnership followed the corporation and
the second corporation followed the partnership, each in turn assuming the
liabilities of the preceding business concern, were not in writing. However,
the point made by the trustee of the estate under the statute of frauds is an
swered by the fact that there was such part performance of the agreements
entered into in each instance as to take it out of the provisions of the statute
of frauds. The succeeding concerns, the partnership following first corporation,
actually received the business assets of the preceding concern and continued the
business of its predecessor.
The continuance of this business is shown by the evidence given before the
referee and it can not be questioned; this is supported in all that took place,
and especially by the fact that the original permanent store fixtures secured
by the original corporation were taken by the following partnership, together
with the stock of goods which were renewed and replaced as the goods and
stock were sold out at retail. The second corporation, in turn, the bankrupt
here, received from the partnership the same fixtures and the stock of mer
chandise that was carried by the partnership and the same business was con
tinued under the same name.
In so far as the record before me goes there is no creditor of the bankrupt
claiming to be protected by any specific lien upon any of the assets of the
bankrupt now in possession of the trustee that entitled said creditor the pay
ment in full, not even any mortgagee of the store fixtures that came from the
first corporation.
The right of the government to priority of payment does not arise from any
lien right, but comes from the provisions of the bankruptcy law taking care
of the tax claims of the United States. This right arose when the Grand
Leader Co. was adjudicated a bankrupt.
If this tax claim is a correct tax claim, as I have indicated above, there is
no cause shown why it should not have priority of payment over the general
creditors of the estate.
In so far as the ruling of the referee does not provide for the priority of pay
ment of the tax claim of the government, which he finds to be due to the
government from the bankrupt, I think his ruling is erroneous and should be
reviewed and sent back to him with directions to arrange for priority of pay
ment of the government’s tax claim.
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